CLW wrote:
> Bob Tiernan wrote:
> > .....a real genius (yes, they have
> > existed from time to time) would have
> > gotten Lee in the same position by the end of
> > summer *without* losing all those men. But
> > since Grant was no genius, and unimaginative
> > to boot, he did what *he* could do.
> Grant fought the way almost every general of his
> time did (including Lee on day three at Gettysburg).
That's odd. I've yet to see the Shatz say
Pickett's Charge was an act of "genius"
in that it resulted in the deaths of
a number of Union troopers (i.e. like
Cold Harbor, I guess, it was all about
moving on to the next battle). You can't
say, "We won't know if this loss of many
of your own troops is an example of genius
until the war is over".
> But, at least Grant recognized that massive loss
> of life was a bad thing.
Kinda late in the game. McClellan, not
that he was the solution to the Union's
problems, realized that before he even
lost too many. I don't know how far
he was going to get, but he was trying to
use artillery and anything but Cold Harbor
type assaults.
> Particularly such things as Cold Harbor (the
> failure of all units to advance in unison which
> resulted in each one being ground up singly)
Well, not that I'm aware of. Each assault was
repelled by just one section of Lee's line so
it wasn't a case of each separate assault
facing the bulk of Lee's army.
> and The Crater (which was Burnside's fault).
> However, frontal assault and the accompanying
> mass casualties continued into WW One.
So what? That it went into World War One
does not mean that anything was particularly
innovative about it. The best large scale
actions of World War one were on the
Eastern Front when manoever played some role.
But to lose tens of thousands in a week
to gain a few yards, and to do that many time
over the course of four years, speaks volumes
about the stupidity of continuing the practice.
> It was more Lee's doing that turned Grants offensive
> in Virginia into a war of attrition. Grant's stated
> desire was to manuever Lee into a stand up fight in
> the open.
More than just a stand-up fight--manuever allows
one to get his opponent into a situation in
which he can often be attacked while strung
out or before and stand-up defensive deployments
made. I think that by earlu 1864 Lee was too
weak to repeat 1863 again and he knew that
a mobile Army of the Potomac would mean trouble.
He prevented that for eleven months, but knew that
it was all a matter of time.
> Lee prevented that by using his internal lines
> and an excellent appraisal of Grants tactics.
That's correct -- and I also note that this
marks a change in your views since not too
long ago you considered Lee's job in this
campaign to be an easy one, i.e. that all
he had to do was march Grant's rate of march.
Well, not so.
> > I suppose if Grant, instead of Napoleon, had
> > gone towards General Mack in the Ulm area in 1805,
> > he wouldn't have been satisifed until he fought
> > a costly battle before pushing Mack into the
> > city where he would surrender (but only after
> > a siege of a few weeks, complete with some
> > stupid Cold Harbor type assaults). Then
> > Shatzer would say, "Sometimes you gotta
> > lose a lot of men to win". Ah, but Napoleon
> > bagged Mack and his army without much of a fight.
> This does not make Napolean a genius.
Why not? He trapped an army and bagged it
without a fight, thus leaving his army
intact for what came after in that campaign.
> Had he been, he would never have
> invaded Russia.
Sort of. Sorry, Charlie, but Napoleon
was indeed a master general worthy of
study. That in his role as head of
state he made the fatal blunder of
thinking he could take on Imperial
Russia is another matter. One could
argue that it's one and the same,
but that ignores the fact that his
management of campaigns from 1796
through 1814, and even a bit of 1815,
was brilliant. Try reading a great
book like "The Campaigns of Napoleon"
by David Chandler.
I don't where you get these ideas. Many
of his campaigns were models on how to
do it.
Bob T
Bill Shatzer wrote:
> Bob Tiernan wrote:
> > I suppose if Grant, instead of Napoleon, had
> > gone towards General Mack in the Ulm area in 1805,
> > he wouldn't have been satisifed until he fought
> > a costly battle before pushing Mack into the
> > city where he would surrender (but only after
> > a siege of a few weeks, complete with some
> > stupid Cold Harbor type assaults). Then
> > Shatzer would say, "Sometimes you gotta
> > lose a lot of men to win". Ah, but Napoleon
> > bagged Mack and his army without much of a fight.
> What part of "sometimes" do you fail to grasp, BT?
Oh, what now, Shatzer?
> That history demonstrates the possibility of (relatively)
> bloodless victories is beyond dispute. But to claim
> that such victories are -always- possible is beyond
> stupid. They are not.
That wasn't the point. My point was that
Grant couldn't even think of trying for a less
costly type of campaign against Lee precisely
*because* he wasn't anything close to being a
genius. He thus had to resort to unimaginative
operations.
> To return to the larger scheme, Cold Harbor was not
> Grant's finest hour.
I thought you said it was a mark of "genius".
> But every general blunders at least once if he
> stays at the general game long enough.
> Grant at least learned from Cold Harbor
I thought you said it was a mark of "genius".
> and didn't attempt a repeat. His overall conduct
> of the 1864-65 campaign was excellent
His overall conduct was unimaginitive
considering what he had to work with.
> and, even with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight,
> you would be hard pressed to come up with a
> better scheme.
Like I said, he did the best *he* could do. Just
like Fredericksburg was the best Burnside could do.
> Given the fog and friction of war, the campaign was
> well conceived and generally well executed
How could it have been well conceived and executed
when his plans broke down early on? His later
writings may have tried to convince us that he
intended doing what he did all along. But
that is not so.
> and qualifies Grant of the "genius" label in a
> profession in which perfection is seldom if ever
> obtainable.
Sorry, but "genius" is reserved for better
commanders. One doesn't even have to
reach perfection to be one, and Grant still
misses out.
> And those rare moments when "prefection" has been obtained
> are often more the result of blind luck or the sheer
> ineptitute of one's opponent than the brilliance of
> the victor.
Oh, in some cases the ineptitude of an opponent
is taken advantage of in ways that marks a
plan as and execution as close to perfect.
And the ineptitude may not always be inept
until turned into that in comparison. I'm
not sure if France 1940 counts, but the
German plan was based on how the French and
allied forces would probably react and on
how they were deployed to begin with.
You can't say that any competent general
would have realized what the best plan
of action would be, for many plans
to assault France could have ended
in a drawn-out campaign considering the
size of the allied forces and the
advantage in tank numbers they had.
One could say that there was still a
"perfect" way to deal with that
military problem, even if the results
may have been predictable.
Bob T
CLW wrote:
> Bill Shatzer wrote:
> > Grant intentionally cut himself loose from those "lines
> > of communications" and took Vicksburg in the process.
> Both communications and supply thus setting an excellent
> example for Sherman after Atlanta.
Yes, this is where some imagination was used (and recall
that my initial claim was that Grant did have some in
the West but went downhill went he went east).
Anyway, both of the above examples were possible
thanks to the ineptness of the Confederate
commands in that they were either letting
themselves (or wanted to) get boxed into seiges
or weren't opposing the Union force at all.
Also, both the area south and southeast of Vicksburg,
and east of Atlanta, were rich in crops and
livestock which made such mobility an option.
> Is there a civil war group that rationally discusses
> these thing without resorting to "would have, should
> have" type crap?
I think it's alt.war.civil.usa
Bob t
CLW wrote:
> Bill Shatzer released:
> > McClellan beat Johnson at Fair Oaks and proceded to immediately
> > retreat! Talk about snatching defeat from the jaws of victory!
> McClellan was the worst example of timid generalship that
> ever tred a battlefield.
This is hardly close to the truth, even for the
US Civil War. Besides the fact that I've shown
that Mac *didn't* retreat (which the Shatz
has not and cannot dispute to this day),
a much better example of timid generalship
was Joseph E. Johnston. The above Fair Oaks
engagement was probably his only attack,
and that only because he needed to attack
Mac at least once before backing into
Richmond (because he knew that Mac's slow
but sure advance to lay seige to Richmond
woud not be stopped once it entrenched
at the gates), but after that his campaigns
were marked by moving in the same direction
as the Union army pursuing him.
It is said by some that Johnston was "at least"
Lee's equal as a defensive strategist. I
can't buy that because a good defensive
strategist would actually attack once in a while
by either recognizing an opportunity or creating
one. Lee could do this. Johnston never did.
Imagine Johnston in command at the time
of Chancellorsville, and then the Wilderness.
He would, just like in the Peninsula and
later against Sherman and Grant, kept
retreating and retreating until there
was no place left to go. Had it not been
for his getting wounded at Fair Oaks,
he may have even abandoned Richmond or
recommended it.
> Is there a connection between a general having a
> "Napolean complex" and being unable to take that
> last step (even though hazzardous) to achieve
> total victory?
That makes no sense considering Napoleon's
many assaults. One time when Napoleon
had misgivings about what he was getting into
was at Borodino after he viewed the field
afterwards, and it is said that Mac had similar
angst after his first major fight in the
Peninsula (I don't recall what that was,
whether as early as Williamsburg or was
it Fair Oaks itself).
Anyway, I hope you're not getting the
impression that I think McClellan was
a great commander or anything. It's
just that his reputation is too often
based on what was said or written by
people who didn't know enough about
the problems of 1862 compared to
what they were in 1864. In other words,
as previously mentioned, armies grew
rapidly by mid 1862 and were populated with
army, corps, and division commanders
who were captains, lieutenants, legislators,
and dry goods clerks a few years before.
There were a lot of logistical problems
to be ironed out, standards to be
implemented, and so on. McClellan
dealt with this for his own army
as it needed to get done. His
successors then enjoyed the system
when it was functioning well. It was
then easier for a commander to send a corps
or two, or his whole army, off in a
certain direction and be able to count on
the logistical tail being managed well.
But somebody had to do that first. To
then be able to move your army about
with that serious matter being less
of a worry was a good thing. And if
leaving your army in a state of inaction
during this period was a price to pay,
so whay? Besides, I believe Sec of War
Stanton was not sending supplies to
McClellan when he wanted them in that
Sept. 18 to early November period.
There's no doubt that Mac's big chance
was the Peninsula campaign and that he
should have moved faster once he landed.
But it was a one-time only deal as the
Lincoln Admin became too chicken in
wanting to allow a strategy that took
troops away from being in between
Washington and Richmond.
In the end you need to see McClellan's
time at the top in light of early
army organization, prospects, and
logistical standards too inadequate
for armies the size of which were
beyond the capabilites of most
commanders to manage smoothly.
Bob t
CLW wrote:
> Bob Tiernan wrote:
> > CLW wrote:
> > > Meade let a golden opportunity pass during the five
> > > days after Gettysburg when he had Lee traped against
> > > the Potomac etc.
> > Maybe so. I'm not impressed by most of those
> > guys. But Lee's reputation, particularly
> > when people thought he was down, was probably
> > worth 20,000 troops.
> I think that (at least early on) the reputation of the Army of Northern
> Virginia rested more on the tactics of Jackson. Lee was a much better
> general on defense than on offence. As at Gettysburg.
Second Manassass and Chancellorsville say
otherwise, or at least that the gap
between hois offensive and defensive
skills was smaller than you think.
> > Ever study how inept the Confederate leadership
> > was in front of grant in 1862-63? CSA generals
> > were Grant's best friends.
> That worked both ways.
How so? The major problem faced by
Grant, Sherman, Halleck and Buell
was logistics, and not any serious
skill in an opponent. Grant would
go east in 1864 expecting Lee to
be no different. That was arrogance
on his part, as Meade would chuckle.
Bob t
"Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
> > McClellan was the worst example of timid generalship that
> > ever tred a battlefield.
Or maybe he was the BEST example of timid generalship, but perhaps it's
because he put too much stock in the Pinkerton nonsense.
One thing few people seem to argue is that Mac genuinely loved his soldiers,
and if it had not been for his skill in organizing the AotP and drilling
them into fighting shape, his successors would not have the successes (?)
that they did.
-c
In article <X8FOa.67524$n%5.15997@no-spam>,
"gatt" <gatt@no-spam> wrote:
> "Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
>
> > > McClellan was the worst example of timid generalship that
> > > ever tred a battlefield.
>
> Or maybe he was the BEST example of timid generalship, but perhaps it's
> because he put too much stock in the Pinkerton nonsense.
>
> One thing few people seem to argue is that Mac genuinely loved his soldiers,
> and if it had not been for his skill in organizing the AotP and drilling
> them into fighting shape, his successors would not have the successes (?)
> that they did.
Perhaps. But I consider McCellans greatest blunder and waste of men to
have occured at Antietam. While you may decry Grants tactics from The
Wilderness to Appamatox, he did not let his enemy get away.
First, After losing so many men at the Bloody Lane McCellan refused to
finish off Lees Army by sending in Franklins Sixth Corps. All the
troops from Sumners Corps that died thus died in vain.
Second, failure to co-ordinate his attacks against Lee so he hit them at
the center and on both flanks simultaneously. He put his men in piece
meal and Lee was able to shift troops and fight the Union Army to a
stand still.
Third, failure to use Porters Fifth Corps to out flank the Confederate
defenders at the Lower Bridge. Thus allowing time for A.P. Hill to
arrive from Harpers Ferry and turn back the Union left.
Fourth, his pursuit of Lee after the battle was pathetic. A Stonewall
Jackson would have run them into the ground and Potomac River.
<clw@no-spam> wrote in message
> > One thing few people seem to argue is that Mac genuinely loved his
soldiers,
> > and if it had not been for his skill in organizing the AotP and drilling
> > them into fighting shape, his successors would not have the successes
(?)
> > that they did.
>
> Perhaps. But I consider McCellans greatest blunder and waste of men to
> have occured at Antietam.
I certainly agree. Except of course that his greatest blunder was not to
turn around and march on Washington. ;>
> Second, failure to co-ordinate his attacks against Lee so he hit them at
> the center and on both flanks simultaneously.
Not to mention he had Lee's actual battle plan the whole time. The Texas
Brigade who opposed the Union right had marched for four days with no food,
rest or shoes and in some of the 100-man companies there were only 5 men
standing after the battle. On average they had 26 to a company so even if
they'd been fully fed and rested they'd have still been at about 25%
strength. Nevertheless, the First Texas managed to hold its line long
enough to save the Confederate army from collapsing.
Actually, to Mac's credit, he'd never have let his ranks fight at such long
odds.
> Fourth, his pursuit of Lee after the battle was pathetic. A Stonewall
> Jackson would have run them into the ground and Potomac River.
Indeed. Of course, Jackson frequently ran his own troops into the ground.
-c
Russell Senior wrote:
> I wish you Civil War masturbaters would find a more appropriate venue
> to discuss this no-doubt-scintillating and highly-relevant topic than
> pdx.general or or.politics.
Tough! It will fade away before too long, but in the time
a few of us prefer the exchange here instead of the
Civil War newsgroup where it will get smothered by
scores of others.
Besides, think of the education a shit head
like Baxter is getting.
Bob t
>>>>> "gatt" == gatt <gatt@no-spam> writes:
clw> Perhaps. But I consider McCellans greatest blunder and waste of [...]
Russell> I wish you Civil War masturbaters would find a more
Russell> appropriate venue to discuss this no-doubt-scintillating and
Russell> highly-relevant topic than pdx.general or or.politics.
gatt> [...] Plus my hat, left leg and Springfield rifle were in the
gatt> Statesman Journal on Sunday so :P I taunt you a second time!
gatt> *snicker*
Thanks for self-identifying.
--
Russell Senior ``shtal latta wos ba padre u prett tu nashtonfi
seniorr@no-spam mrlosh'' -- Bashgali Kafir for ``If you have
had diarrhoea many days you will surely die.''
gatt wrote:
> Ya don't have to read it. You should know however that one of the soldiers
> who found Lee's lost order was an officer named Finley, for whom a dormitory
> at Oregon State was named. Finley's colleague was a Mr. Benton, who was
> imprisoned at Alcatraz for attempting to seize a Union warship to bring to
> the Confederacy.
Neither of these names are ones I recall as being involved
with the finding of the orders.
Bob T
CLW wrote:
> Gatt wrote:
> > One thing few people seem to argue is that Mac
> > genuinely loved his soldiers, and if it had not
> > been for his skill in organizing the AotP and
> > drilling them into fighting shape, his successors
> > would not have the successes (?) that they did.
> Perhaps.
There's no perhaps about it. Organization in
particular needed to get hammered out earlier
rather than sooner. It has been mentioned by
some officers that Mac's influence on the
performance of the Army of the Potomac remained
for the rest of the war.
When Grant arrived in the east in 1864 he
benefitted from the professionalism of
that army. Grant was rather slow and stupid
when it came to important things like a
signal corps. Sherman, too. One day in
1862 Sherman was asked by an officer
regarding the size of his signal corps
component under his command and he
replied, "What's a signal corps?"
> But I consider McCellans greatest blunder and
> waste of men to have occured at Antietam.
Yes, that was by far his best opportunity.
Or perhaps it was his failure to move
faster (despite potential setbacks and
casualties) in his approach towards
Richmond in May and June of 1862 (but
to be fair, that failure was more political
than military as the Lincoln Admin was
really nervous from the get-go regarding
*not* having troops between Richmond
and Washington--after the Peninsula Campaign
Lincoln wouldn't allow this strategy to
be a main one for another two years).
> While you may decry Grants tactics from The
> Wilderness to Appamatox, he did not let
> his enemy get away.
And Grant's love of the costly assault
continued long after most generals
realized this tactic was not worth it.
Besides, when was Lee trying to "get away"
from Grant (other than when he abondoned
Richmond and Petersburg and tried
to get away on emaciated horses and
stuff?). Hint: For ten months, Lee
wasn't interested in going *anywhere*
safer.
> First, After losing so many men at the Bloody Lane
> McCellan refused to finish off Lees Army by sending
> in Franklins Sixth Corps. All the troops from
> Sumners Corps that died thus died in vain.
My sources say that when Franklin arrived next
to Sumner's Corps it was the latter as senior
corps commander on the scene who refused to
allow Franklin to make the attack. While
Richardson's Division did well on his part
of Sumner's line, the latter's other two
divisions had been repulsed (and Richardson
was wounded and removed). That was apparently
enough for Sumner. Franklin sent a message
to Mac to protest this, but Mac deferred to
the corps commander on the scene.
This is not an apologia for Mac, but you
really need to read more than superficial
stuff.
> Second, failure to co-ordinate his attacks
> against Lee so he hit them at the center and
> on both flanks simultaneously. He put his men
> in piece meal and Lee was able to shift troops
> and fight the Union Army to a stand still.
That is true in some ways. The problem was
one that's more a case of communications
than in the plan going according to plans.
For example, Burnside's attack on the
southern end of the line was supposed to
take place hours earlier. It wasn't.
It was to be a diversionary attack.
From a whole corps than can be quite
a diversion, even if Burnside was
running that show. The division
commanders making those attacks, when
they came, were aggressive enough to
overcome Burnside's own lack of
drive (Sturgis, for example, he
being the future Colonel of the
7th Cavalry from 1869 to after
Little Big Horn, and father of the
officer who gave his name to Sturgis,
South Dakota of motorcycle rally fame).
Also, the attack on the northern end of
the line, carried out by Hooker and
Mansfield, while initially repulsed,
were further affected by the death
of Mansfield and the wounding of
Hooker, these events leaving nobody
in overall command of this main
attack (and those two were among
Mac's more aggressive subordinates).
The regrouping of both the I and XII
Corps thus lasted longer than it
needed to be.
Again, check the details.
> Third, failure to use Porters Fifth Corps
> to out flank the Confederate defenders at
> the Lower Bridge.
That would be the Middle Bridge. Porter
had only two of his three divisions,
one of them commanded by Sykes whose
nickname was "Tardy George". I don't
know how clear any opportunity was
seen to be, but those two division
were all there was between the
Confederate center and McClellan's
HeadQuarters. Gotta keep a reserve
for the unexpected, no? By the
way, Pleasonton crossed the Middle
Bridge with Sykes, and Custer
was probably at his side though I
find no real mention of this
in Custer's writings (letters of
the time). He was working on
his CW memoirs when he was killed,
and had gotten only as far as the
end of the Peninsula Campaign.
This unfinished memoir is hard to
come by but forunately I have a copy.
> Thus allowing time for A.P. Hill to
> arrive from Harpers Ferry and turn
> back the Union left.
This is also true, but with the
usual interesting details left out.
Burnside (or Cox, commanding the
corps while Burnside kept command
of the "left wing"--why I don't
know since his other corps, Hooker's,
was way over on the right) had
no cavalry to be able to keep
an eye on troop movements behind
the ridges (the ground is very broken
here with ridges blocking views--I
was surprised at these terrain features
when I was there in 1999). Also,
when Hill's men were arriving they
may have confused Burnside a bit
since a lot of them were wearing
blue uniforms recently captured
at Harper's Ferry.
In the end you're saying that Mac
should have fought the battle
in a way we all know (and Lee knew
at the time) Mac couldn't do.
That's why Lee was still there.
If Mac was capable of doing that,
Lee wouldn't have been there.
You're saying something like, "Oh,
if only I had purchased a Powerball
ticket tonight I might be a millionaire".
> Fourth, his pursuit of Lee after the battle
> was pathetic.
It wasn't much, that's for sure. But
I don't know what you'd expect. Many
of Lee's men were on the south side
of the Potomac as they refused to
cross on principle in the first place
(a problem they didn't have a year
later), so Lee must have started
seeing his ranks fill up again.
Besides, one thing that is noticed
about Civil War armies is that
they were essentially incapable of
finishing off an opponent even
after a victory (such a final
coup type of attack would be
very costly, and were usually
possible only when armies were
on the move again--a time when
it was hard to pin them down
again).
As I mentioned earlier, Mac was
hard pressed in the aftermath
of Antietam to deal with his
logistical problems and to do
more than just replenish--he
reorganized this part of his
organization into a more
efficient system. He was in
no real condition to make a
pursuit of Lee. He could have
started one, but it was not
easy or safe to start something
that couldn't be finished.
Did you read my long post
dealing with all of this last week?
McClellan wasn't going to win the
war, but his year in command really
needs to be examined from a number
of points of view. Again, what
he had to deal with in 1862
was more complex than in 1863
and even more so than in 1864.
A Grant or Sherman might have
been able to get away with
straightening out their logistics
system were they in Mac's place, but
only because their explanations to
Lincoln and Stanton would have
been straightforward rather than
the curt and close-to-insubordinate
type that Mac sent. That's a
personality flaw, not a timidity
flaw.
> A Stonewall Jackson would have run
> them into the ground and Potomac River.
Well, not even Jackson should be
portrayed as such a superman.
He was the closest to a Lannes
that Lee had, but he wasn't
always on the mark. Recall
that while in the advance on
the way to deal with Pope a
month earlier, he fought
a battle at Cedar Mountain
that wasn't much to study.
Bob T
"Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
> > Ya don't have to read it. You should know however that one of the
soldiers
> > who found Lee's lost order was an officer named Finley, for whom a
dormitory
> > at Oregon State was named. Finley's colleague was a Mr. Benton, who was
> > imprisoned at Alcatraz for attempting to seize a Union warship to bring
to
> > the Confederacy.
>
>
> Neither of these names are ones I recall as being involved
> with the finding of the orders.
You are correct. I just did a quick search on it and discovered that the
person credited with finding it is Bloss, ie 1st Sgt John M Bloss of the
27th Indiana.
Bloss Hall and Finley Hall at OSU are twin dormitories. The original story I
read credited Finley with finding the order so I think the author of the
story confused the two. Here are a couple of links for provenance:
http://osulibrary.oregonstate.edu/archives/exhibits/presidents/bloss.html
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Barracks/3627/links.html
Thanks for the catch.
-c
"Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
> > Yep, he lost that many men and then failed to ennoble
> > their deaths by making the last attack that could
> > have ended the war....
>
> 1) It wouldn't have ended the war.
I think it would have. Had he moved his men with the tenacity of, say,
Jackson or Forrest he could have prevented Lee from establishing an
effective battle line, and had he driven the ANV when they began to fall
back and retreat he almost certainly could have knocked them into complete
disarray or driven them into the river.
Bruce Catton suggests the same thing in much of his (Pulitzer-winning)
writing.
It wouldn't have ended the war right away, but had he managed to smash the
Confederacy's only effective army and its greatest leaders (except Cleburne
and Forrest) it would have probably knocked 1864 and 1865 out of the war and
saved hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars of property
north and south.
-c
gatt wrote:
> "Bob Tiernan" wrote:
> > CLW wrote:
> > > Yep, he lost that many men and then failed to ennoble
> > > their deaths by making the last attack that could
> > > have ended the war....
> > 1) It wouldn't have ended the war.
> I think it would have.
It's not like there were no other
Confederate soldiers and units
that could be assembled to prevent
a march on Richmond following
such a battle. Keep in mind
that within a few weeks of fighting
at Sharpsburg Lee's army was about
85,000 strong (he fought the battle
with about 39,000).
But this all ignores the fact that
there'd be no such battle had someone
else been in charge of the Army of the
Potomac other than McClellan. Lee
would simply have not been there.
Ah, but Mac was there, too. But
to say, "If only Mac had...." is
like saying that "If only W.C. Fields
had begged David O. Selznick for the role
of Rhett Butler..." No, that wasn't
going to happen no matter how much
he begged. And Mac wasn't going to fight
a different battle no matter how much
one could have begged him to take
advantage of this or that.
Lee wouldn't have been if Mac was
like that. Even if Mac was more
aggressive, there would have been
a lot more casualties taken to
actually drive the Confederates
across the Potomac while bagging
many others.
Don't you guyz get it yet?
> Had he moved his men with the tenacity of, say,
> Jackson or Forrest he could have prevented Lee
> from establishing an effective battle line
The attack by Hooker's and Mansfield's
corps were aggressivem *and* repulsed
just the same.
[snip]
> Bruce Catton suggests the same thing in much
> of his (Pulitzer-winning) writing.
Catton was a very good writer (I've read
his CW trilogy as well as his Army of the
Potomac trilogy). I don't consult his
books too much anymore.
Bob T
"Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
> > I think it would have.
>
>
> It's not like there were no other Confederate soldiers and units
> that could be assembled to prevent a march on Richmond following
> such a battle.
Well, there was the Army of Tennessee which was probably the next closest,
but it would have taken them longer to reach Richmond than it would have
taken the AoP to get there. Bragg certainly couldn't have gotten up there
in time.
>Keep in mind that within a few weeks of fighting at Sharpsburg Lee's army
was about
> 85,000 strong (he fought the battle with about 39,000).
Had the command structure itself collapsed at Sharpsburg, the massive
amounts of sick, wounded and ill who made up the balance would have had no
organizational readiness to fight. I don't think they could have saved
Richmond. (The loss of Richmond wouldn't have been the end of the
Confederacy, per se.) I can't believe that the war could have continued
without Lee, the Army of Northern Virginia. 'Cause, really, it didn't.
Grant had no problem taking Vicksburg, Butler had no problem taking New
Orleans, Sherman had little trouble going pretty much wherever he wanted.
If those southern forces--who had nowhere near the skill or fighting spirit
as the ANV--had been moved up to protect Virginia, the Union armies in the
west and deep south would have been literally unopposed.
The Confederacy was outmanned and outequipped as it was. They couldn't have
sustained the loss of Lee's army given that they ultimately lost even WITH
his army.
=c
gatt wrote:
> "Bob Tiernan" wrote:
> > It's not like there were no other Confederate soldiers and units
> > that could be assembled to prevent a march on Richmond following
> > such a battle.
> Well, there was the Army of Tennessee which was
> probably the next closest, but it would have
> taken them longer to reach Richmond than it would
> have taken the AoP to get there.
I'm not talking about armies in other theaters, but
the CSA soldiers in Virginia (either in the
Richmond defenses, points north of Richmond, or
the many stragglers and others who were waiting on
the south side of the Potomac after they refused to
leave CSA territory).
> Had the command structure itself collapsed at Sharpsburg,
> the massive amounts of sick, wounded and ill who made up
> the balance would have had no organizational readiness
> to fight.
Again, I'm not talking about any sort of army
made up of invalids, but of ready-to-fight
soldiers who were in Virginia and not with
Lee at Antietam.
> I don't think they could have saved Richmond. (The
> loss of Richmond wouldn't have been the end of the
> Confederacy, per se.) I can't believe that the war
> could have continued without Lee, the Army of
> Northern Virginia. 'Cause, really, it didn't.
That's because by the time Lee surrendered
the other Confederate forces had pretty much
lost most of the territoy outside of
Virginia--Johnston was in North Carolina
heading for Virginia and had yet to turn around
to fight Sherman or make the attempt.
But anyway, this is all worthless even as
speculation because, as I've stated, there
wouldn't have been a battle of Antietam
in the first place had anyone other than
McClellan been in command of Union forces
in the campaign. Lee wouldn't have
been waiting there. And he wouldn't
have stayed there the day after,
essentially mooning the Union army.
Bob t
"Bob Tiernan" <zulu.pacifier.com@no-spam> wrote in message
> > Well, there was the Army of Tennessee which was
> > probably the next closest, but it would have
> > taken them longer to reach Richmond than it would
> > have taken the AoP to get there.
>
> I'm not talking about armies in other theaters, but
> the CSA soldiers in Virginia (either in the Richmond defenses, points
north of Richmond, or
> the many stragglers and others who were waiting on the south side of the
Potomac after they refused to
> leave CSA territory).
I see to whom you're referring, but I don't know if those were high-enough
caliber soldiers with enough quality leadership to stop the veteran AoP for
too long.
> Again, I'm not talking about any sort of army made up of invalids, but of
ready-to-fight
> soldiers who were in Virginia and not with Lee at Antietam.
How many of those were there, do you know?
>there wouldn't have been a battle of Antietam in the first place had
anyone other than
> McClellan been in command of Union forces in the campaign. Lee wouldn't
have
> been waiting there. And he wouldn't have stayed there the day after,
> essentially mooning the Union army.
I suspect that is true.
-c
gatt wrote:
> "Bob Tiernan" wrote:
> > I'm not talking about armies in other theaters, but
> > the CSA soldiers in Virginia (either in the Richmond
> > defenses, points north of Richmond, or the many
> > stragglers and others who were waiting on the south
> > side of the Potomac after they refused to
> > leave CSA territory).
> I see to whom you're referring, but I don't know if those
> were high-enough caliber soldiers with enough quality
> leadership to stop the veteran AoP for too long.
A lot of them were already ANV soliders, and
as for the others keep in mind that various units
stationed along the coastal areas and other
points were moved in and out of the ANV as
needed.
> > Again, I'm not talking about any sort of army
> > made up of invalids, but of ready-to-fight
> > soldiers who were in Virginia and not with Lee
> > at Antietam.
> How many of those were there, do you know?
Tens of thousands, apparently.
Bob t